

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY J. C. SPETZ DATE FEB 29 1964

1604

RDS	or	XDS	EXT.	DATE	REASON(S)
TS AUTH.					
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS					
DECLASSIFIED					
RELEASE DENIED					
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS					

10/1/62

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At 7:35 p.m. I met Fomin in the Statler Hotel Lobby as per his suggestion. At his suggestion, we went to the Coffee Shop in the Hotel to talk. I told him, "I have reason to believe that the United States Government sees real possibilities in this and supposes that the representatives of the USSR and the United States in New York can work this matter out with U Thant and with each other. I told him it was my definite impression that time was very urgent and that time was very short. I reiterated it was my impression that time was exceedingly short.

He listened attentively and then asked whether my information came from high sources. I told him the information came from the highest sources in the United States Government. He asked a second time if I were absolutely sure it came from the highest sources. I reiterated this a second time. He then said that if the information did not come from the highest sources and he reported it, he could be made to look like a fool at a very critical time. I replied that I would be the most irresponsible man in the world if I lied about something as important as this at this very critical time. He then seemed assured that I was telling the truth. At this point he said he wanted to be sure that both knew the arrangements we were discussing. I then told him my understanding:

that the offensive Cuban missile sites would be dismantled under United Nations supervision, that Castro would publicly pledge never to receive offensive weapons again, that the Soviet Union would also promise not to ship them again, and that in return the United States would publicly promise not to invade Cuba. He agreed that this was precisely what we had mentioned. At this point, Fomin asked whether I knew it would be possible to have the United Nations inspectors also check the American military bases in Florida to make sure that there would be no invasion of Cuba. He also asked whether it would be possible to inspect surrounding Caribbean countries. I replied I did not know because this was a completely new element which he was introducing for the first time. He agreed that he had not mentioned it before, but, he mentioned, "I am a Layman and a small boy and I am just asking."

I replied I could only answer as a reporter since I did not have any official information. It was my impression, I said, that this would raise a terrible complication because there are no American offensive missiles pointed at Cuba as there are in Cuba so that the situations were different. Furthermore, I pointed out that once the \_\_\_\_\_ →

At 1:30 p.m. I met Fomin in the Statler Hotel Lobby as per his suggestion. At his suggestion, we went to the Coffee Shop in the Hotel to talk. I told him, "I have reason to believe that the United States Government sees real possibilities in this and supposes that the representatives of the USSR and the United States in New York can work this matter out with U Thant and with each other. I told him it was my definite impression that time was very urgent and that time was very short. I reiterated it was my impression that time was exceedingly short.

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missile bases in Cuba were dismantled and that Cuba pledged never to receive them again, the need for the mobilization of American Forces in Florida would not exist, so presumably these forces would return to their posts and the situation in Florida would revert to normal.

But, I said, to ask the President to agree to allow foreign inspectors in Florida at this time would put him in a difficult position at home, because many right wingers in the United States were demanding that Cuba be invaded at all costs and that they would interpret this that the President was going "soft."

Fomin then asked how the Soviets could be sure that the coast of Florida and the nearby Caribbean countries would not be used as the jumping off point for a future invasion. I said on this that he would have to rely on the word of the United States Government, that it did not intend to invade Cuba itself and that it did not intend to allow Cuban refugees to use American soil for such attacks.

I repeated again that any effort to insist inspectors check the American mobilization in Florida or Caribbean countries would raise a terrible complication at a period when time was of the essence in settling the Cuban problem.

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He then told me that he could assure me that this information would be communicated immediately to the highest Soviet sources and simultaneously to Mr. Borin. He reiterated this a second time. He then said he wanted to get right back to the Embassy and left with me so quickly he did not wait for his change at the cashier's cage. As we said Goodbye in the lobby he said he might be in touch with me again and that he had both my office and home telephone number. I told him I would be glad to talk with him at any time.

I got the impression that the new element that he raised was something that he was trying out for size on me. When I told him of the domestic and other repercussions which would make acceptance extremely unlikely he raised no objection. The entire meeting took 20 minutes.

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